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The workings of the anti-apartheid oil boycott have attracted little scholarly attention to date. 
Their symbolic importance and contribution to the significant escalation of financial cost for 
the Apartheid state has been noted, as has the role of Western states and multinational oil 
companies and Middle Eastern oil states in undermining the boycott. This article focuses on 
an aspect of the boycott which has received insufficient attention: the role in the boycott of 
the African National Congress (ANC) and of the Shipping Research Bureau (SRB), the Dutch 
anti-apartheid organisation specially established in 1979 to trace oil shipments to South 
Africa. Through a close reading of under-utilised source materials, the article analyses the 
ANC’s handling of the SRB’s identification of Middle Eastern anti-apartheid allies as the 
primary source of oil supplies to South Africa throughout the length of the boycott. The 
SRB’s ‘anti-apartheid forensics’ was hamstrung by the ANC’s asymmetrical emphasis on the 
collaboration of Western oil companies with Apartheid. Dependence on invaluable anti-
Apartheid solidarities of various kinds constrained the ANC’s ability to act vis-à-vis allies, 
who in pursuing their own interests, were in violation of the boycott.  
 
  ** 
 
In December, 1978 Brewster Kingman Jnr, United States Ambassador to the United Kingdom 
wrote a memorandum on the prospects of a British and American backed oil boycott against 
Apartheid South Africa:  
  
Evasion is inevitable – by the South Africans who will be admired for their ingenuity in 
adversity, by neighbouring African states; by governments which refuse the sanctions 
order or are lax in its enforcement, by the shell games of international oil companies or 
by the intrigues of private entrepreneurs.1 
 
It would be hard to find a more apt description of the actually existing anti-apartheid oil 
boycott; a mandatory boycott did not materialise, for many of the reasons Brewster 
mentioned. As is well known, until a late Apartheid volte-face Brewster’s own government 
and American companies were central to stonewalling anti-Apartheid boycott efforts. While 
there is an increasingly large and sophisticated body of literature on the workings of the 
international anti-apartheid movement, as Simon Stevens has recently noted few studies have 
had much to say about the concrete ‘impact of anti-apartheid activities,’ which have tended to 
be ‘assumed or implied rather than analysed.’2 Within the larger literature, the anti-apartheid 
                                                 
1 ‘Britain and South Africa Sanctions’ December 15, 1978, Canonical ID: 1978LONDON20694_d Available at: 
https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1978LONDON20694_d.html 
 
2 Simon Stevens, ‘The external struggle against Apartheid: New Perspectives’ Humanity: An International 
Journal of Human Rights, Humanitarianism, and Development, Volume 7, Number 2, Summer 2016, p 307. 
Important texts on the global anti-apartheid movement include Neta Crawford and Audie Klotz (eds) How 
Sanctions Work: Lessons from South Africa (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1999); Rob Skinner, The 
Foundations of Anti-Apartheid: Liberal Humanitarians and Transnational Activists in Britain and the United 
States, c.1919-64 (Basingstoke; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010); Ryan M. Irwin Gordian Knot: 
Apartheid and the Unmaking of the Liberal World Order (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012); Stephen 
Ellis External Mission: The ANC in Exile, 1960–1990 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013);  Christabel 
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oil boycott, the subject of this paper, has attracted very little serious academic attention, with 
Neta Crawford coming closest.3 The greatest detail is in fact to be found in anti-apartheid 
publications such as the 1995 book, Embargo: Apartheid's Oil Secrets Revealed, which was 
edited by two former members of the Shipping Research Bureau (SRB), the Dutch anti-
apartheid organisation which tracked oil shipments to Apartheid South Africa.4  
Those who have written about the oil boycott agree that it was ineffective with respect 
to its stated goal of significantly disrupting oil supplies, but the boycott, such as it was, 
nonetheless significantly escalated the financial costs of the Apartheid state. Estimates of 
these costs are exceedingly difficult because the state and other agents shrouded oil dealings 
in a web of secrecy, enforced by draconian South African legislation. Any estimate would 
have to incorporate expenditure for both on and off-shore oil and gas exploration; for 
importing additional crude for strategic stockpiling; construction of strategic storage facilities 
for stockpiled crude and the loss of interest resulting from maintenance of this stockpile; 
premiums paid to middle-men and traders of imported oil; the cost of the development, 
construction and maintenance of Sasol and Mossgas plants and subsidies supporting their 
production, and the cost of compensating multinational refineries for mothballing their 
production to take on SASOL and Mossgas output. In 1986 State President P.W. Botha 
repeatedly claimed that between 1973 and 1984 the state “had to pay R22 billion more than it 
would have normally spent” to secure oil supplies.5 The Shipping Research Bureau (SRB), 
the Dutch anti-apartheid organisation which monitored oil deliveries to South Africa 
estimated that the oil embargo increased costs two-fold, by approximately $34.6 billion 
between 1979 and 1993.6 Both estimates are necessarily partial, but they give some sense of 
the massive costs which autarkic projects and the boycott entailed for the country.  
In addition to pointing to these immense financial costs, Crawford argued that like 
other anti-apartheid boycotts, the oil boycott did important symbolic work, uniting diverse 
constituents in moral condemnation of apartheid.7 This makes intuitive sense: the posters, 
placards and banners targeting the Royal Dutch Shell oil company for its association with 
Apartheid may very well be the defining images of the anti-apartheid boycotts in toto. 
Granting this symbolic effect and the fact that the oil boycott undoubtedly massively 
increased the financial costs of Apartheid, this paper is primarily concerned with accounting 
for the failure of the boycott in its narrowest, practical aspect and identifying what this failure 
might mean for our understanding of the international anti-apartheid movement. Explanations 
                                                 
Gurney ‘‘A Great Cause’: The Origins of the Anti-Apartheid Movement, June 1959-March 1960’ Journal of 
Southern African Studies, Vol. 26, No. 1 (Mar., 2000), 123-144; Denis Herbstein White Lies: Canon Collins and 
the Secret War Against Apartheid (Oxford: James Currey Publishers, 2004); Arianna Lissoni, ‘The South 
African Liberation Movements in Exile, c. 1945–1970’ (Ph.D. thesis, School of Oriental and African Studies, 
University of London, 2008); Francis Nesbitt, Race for Sanctions: African Americans against Apartheid, 1946–
1994 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004); Hakan Thorn, Anti-Apartheid and the Emergence of a 
Global Civil Society (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006) 
 
3 Neta Crawford ‘Oil Sanctions Against Apartheid’ in Neta Crawford and Audie Klotz (eds) How Sanctions 
Work, 103-126. 
 
4 See for example Arthur Jay Klinghoffer Oiling the Wheels of Apartheid: Exposing South Africa’s Secret Oil 
Trade (Boulder: L. Rienner, 1989); Richard Hengeveld and Jaap Rodenburg (Eds) Embargo. Apartheid's Oil 
Secrets Revealed. (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 1995); Martin Bailey, Oilgate: The Sanctions 
Scandal (London: Coronet, Hodder & Stoughton, 1989); Paul Conlon, ‘South Africa’s Attempts to Reduce 
Dependence on Imported Oil’ (United Nations Centre against Apartheid, October 1985)  
5 Embargo, 22 
6 Embargo, 191 
7 Crawford, ‘Oil Sanctions Against Apartheid’ pp 103-128; Stephen Ellis, External Mission, 109-110; Kevin 
Davie ‘Apartheid and the Cost of Self-Sufficiency’ in Hengeveld and Rodenburg (Eds) Embargo, pp 242-253. 
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for the failure to significantly physically disrupt oil supplies have focused on a mixture of 
Cold War realpolitik and pecuniary self-interest as the fundamental obstacles to success. As 
Arthur Klinghoffer observed, governments, oil companies, and shipping companies typically 
adopted a ‘the moral high road in public, condemning apartheid and even endorsing the oil 
embargo and claiming adherence to its principles’ while secretly taking ‘the low road of 
pecuniary interest.’8 Western hypocrisy has been singled out, though there has also been 
some recognition that Middle Eastern states ‘placed themselves in the unique situation of 
being able to condemn apartheid while, at the same time, lubricating its wheels.’9 There has, 
however, been insufficient attention paid to the role of the African National Congress in this 
history and, in particular, its response to the fact of the overwhelming proportion of Middle 
Eastern oil which found its way to Apartheid South Africa originated in states which were 
nominally supporters of the anti-apartheid boycott.  
Drawing on under-utilised sources, the article begins by emphasising the enduring 
importance of multinational oil companies and Middle Eastern crude oil imports to Apartheid 
South Africa’s oil strategy. The workings of the anti-apartheid oil boycott are analysed, and, 
in particular, the laborious detective work – what I call an ‘anti-apartheid forensics’ – of the 
Shipping Research Bureau (SRB), a Dutch organisation established in 1979 to trace oil 
shipments to South Africa, which worked closely with the ANC-in-exile. Through a close 
reading of the SRB’s own published history of its activities, I argue that the SRB’s work was 
hamstrung by the ANC’s asymmetrical approach to the oil boycott which emphasised the 
collaboration of Western oil companies with Apartheid, at the expense of a focus on the role 
of anti-apartheid allies who, pursuing their own interests, were repeatedly identified by the 
SRB as the primary source of crude supplies to South Africa. The ANC’s reluctance to single 
out anti-apartheid allies in violation of the boycott and its inability to bring them to heel, 
reflected the organisation’s dependence on these same governments for valuable sources of 
anti-apartheid solidarity. 
 
Apartheid oil strategy and prospective oil boycott 
 
South Africa possesses no indigenous source of oil and has long been highly dependent upon 
imported crude, almost exclusively sourced from the Middle East. Such was the extent of the 
country’s dependence on imported oil that heightened political instability in the aftermath of 
the establishment of the state of Israel prompted the newly elected National Party government 
to fast-track the establishment of a synthetic oil-from-coal project, SASOL, in the early 
1950s.10 The often feverish official talk at this time warning of the imminent interruption of 
Middle Eastern supplies reflected real anxieties, but SASOL’s initial contribution to overall 
supplies should not be overestimated. It was well known that because of the comparatively 
small initial production capacity of the first oil-from-coal plant the project would have made 
little difference in the event of an international emergency affecting crude supplies. To this 
day the synthetic contribution only amounts to approximately forty percent of total petrol 
supplies despite the addition of three further synthetic fuel plants in the late apartheid period. 
Imported oil has therefore long made up by far the largest proportion of South African 
supplies, which is why the apartheid state gave them such consistently close attention and 
why they became a target of anti-apartheid boycott campaigners.  
                                                 
8 Klinghoffer, Oiling the Wheels, 3. 
9 Cited in Embargo, 269. See also Ellis, External Mission, 144 
10 For more on the SASOL project see Stephen Sparks ‘Between ‘Artificial Economics’ and the ‘Discipline of 
the Market’: Sasol from Parastatal to Privatisation’, Journal of Southern African Studies, 42:4 (2016) 
711-724 
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The Suez crisis, beginning in 1956 with Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser’s 
nationalisation of the British and French owned Suez Canal Company underlined the fragility 
of a world order organised around the continued flow of crude oil from the Middle East. 
Nasser’s articulation of Pan-Arab and anti-imperialist Third Worldism did not go unnoticed 
in South Africa, where it prompted the first speculations at high levels of state about the 
prospect of a possible anti-apartheid oil boycott. ‘I can imagine Colonel Nasser giving 
instructions that no oil be distributed to South Africa on race grounds,’ observed Etienne 
Rousseau, Managing Director of SASOL and the state’s de-facto oil advisor, in 1958.11  
It was the Sharpeville massacre two years later, and the world-wide condemnation 
and brief capital flight which it provoked that necessitated more earnest official deliberations 
about oil strategy. A matter of days after the massacre the Conference of Independent African 
States met in Addis Ababa, making the first truly high-profile international call for an oil 
boycott. Within a month of the massacre Rousseau had met with an Isreali lawyer B.M. 
Schlosberg, hoping to draw on that country’s short experience navigating oil boycotts. 
Schlosberg emphasised the urgency of South Africa initiating the stockpiling of oil ‘for at 
least three months’ but assured Rousseau that unprincipled ‘alternative sources’ of crude 
could easily be secured.12 Rousseau explained to the state that since oil was plentiful and 
cheap and because ceteris paribus it is cheaper to produce a barrel of petrol from refined 
crude oil than from coal, it was logical that the country should purchase petroleum in bulk for 
stock-piling rather than expanding synthetic oil-from-coal production via SASOL.13  
Israeli precedent convinced Rousseau there was ‘little chance of total interruption’ of 
supply to South Africa because of competition between Middle Eastern crude producers on 
an oversupplied market and the unlikelihood of co-ordinated action against the country. In 
any case, he reported that South Africa had “enough friends in different parts of the world” to 
keep supplies coming. Rousseau declared himself confident that the MOCs subscribed to 
‘well informed business opinion’, and possessed ‘a measure of sympathy’, appreciating 
handsome returns on South African investments. He hypothesised that for the Middle Eastern 
oil producers oil income was ‘too important and the problems in South Africa too 
unimportant’, and though solidarity strikes by dockworkers in the world’s ports might prove 
an obstacle, fifty-one per cent of the world’s oil tanker fleet were ‘in private hands, the sort of 
hands that are not likely to be supportive of an emotional boycott.’ 14   
In the years immediately following Sharpeville the calls for an oil boycott mounted. 
The United Nations General Assembly resolution on Namibia in November 1963 urged an oil 
embargo on South Africa and in July 1964 the Organization of African Unity (OAU) called 
for a general oil embargo of South Africa. In April 1964 the International Conference on 
Economic Sanctions against South Africa was held in London. Driven by anti-apartheid 
activist and journalist Ronald Segal and organised under the auspices of the British Anti-
Apartheid Movement, the conference was sponsored by eleven African and Asian 
governments, which sent delegates, joining a group of South African exiles, delegates from 
                                                 
11 National Archives Repository (SAB) HEN, 3513/539, South African Coal, Oil and Gas Corporation Limited 
(SASOL) ‘Die Kwesbaarheid van Suid-Afrika se Olievoorsiening’ E. Rousseau to F.J. du Toit, 13 June, 1958. 
See also SAB, MES 219, H4/7/1 SASOL Algemeen, E. Rousseau Memo to N. Diederichs, 12 March 1963. 
12 SAB MES 219, H4/7/1 SASOL Algemeen, E. Rousseau Memo about Oil Supply in Times of Crisis, 18 July 
1960 
 
13 SAB, MES 219, H4/7/1 Sasol Algemeen, E. Rousseau, memorandum ‘Oil Supply in Times of Crisis’, 18 
July 1960  
 
14 SAB, MES 219, H4/7/1 SASOL Algemeen, E. Rousseau Memo about Oil Supply in Times of Crisis, 18 July 
1960. 
  
5 
 
Communist states, as well as from Western nongovernmental organizations.15 The conference 
proceedings were published that same year by the Penguin African Library which Segal 
founded, under the title Sanctions against South Africa, and exerted considerable influential 
over debates at the United Nations about anti-apartheid boycott strategies.16 The volume 
including a chapter by Brian Lapping (with the help of a group of Young Fabians) focused 
specifically on the prospects of an oil boycott. Lapping predicted that with advanced warning 
of a boycott threat and a glut of oil on the market South Africa could be expected to stockpile 
significant amounts of oil, including – he speculated presciently – in disused mines.  
Lupping identified Western interests as of paramount concern for the success or 
otherwise of the boycott. ‘The large oil-consuming countries, especially the United States and 
those in Western Europe, are the ones we need to worry about,’ he observed. If the boycott 
was to have any hope of succeeding it would need to be enforced by a blockade, with 
undivided Western support. Enforcing a boycott would require a ‘vast team of United Nations 
inspectors’ who would need to monitor shipping movements in the manner of Lloyd’s of 
London shipping agents. Lapping’s evaluation of the likely efficacy of a boycott was both 
pessimistic and astute: 
 
It is difficult to erect barriers: the sellers eager to dispose of their goods to anybody at 
cut prices; the buyer, in the case of South Africa, probably prepared to pay exceptionally 
high prices. In such conditions shrewd businessmen - and no one can predict their 
nationality - rapidly become millionaires. No boycott can expect to seal this type of gap 
completely, particularly when there are too many oil tankers in the world… 
 
Catching ‘fly-by-night speculator[s]’ would require ‘an impossibly large international police 
operation.’ These observations showed generally impressive foresight, though, with the 
benefit of hindsight, Lupping – like other anti-apartheid activists – underestimated the 
importance of non-Western interests in determining the success of the boycott.  
 
The Apartheid state’s oil czar Rousseau got wind of the growing talk of an oil boycott while 
travelling in Europe on a business-trip in 1964. He wrote:  
 
It is now generally realised that oil is the one place where S.A. is vulnerable; that an oil 
boycott would be difficult to make effective; that the overall political play in the world is 
of overwhelming importance; that certain aspects of S.A. policy are unacceptable even 
with S.A. friends, and we should not entirely discount concerted action in our 
thinking…although the chances of an overall oil boycott are remote, we would be wise 
to take precautionary steps…it is possible that in five years’ time the West may regard 
an oil boycott as a feasible tool with which to bring S.A. in line with accepted Western 
thinking.’17  
 
Official precautionary steps first came to fruition shortly thereafter with the formal 
establishment of the Strategic Fuel Fund (SFF). Specially tasked with acquiring crude oil 
supplies for the state’s strategic oil needs, the SFF was physically housed within SASOL, 
at its Sasolburg headquarters, and managed by the parastatal’s senior staff until 1983. As 
Lupping had predicted, mined out coal mines in the country were converted into zero-
                                                 
15 Skinner, The Foundations of Anti-Apartheid, 188-192 
16 Stevens, ‘The external struggle against Apartheid’, 306 
17 SASOL Archive, 18/1/15, Strategic Oil Committee, E. Rousseau to Mr Marlow, 23 June 1964 
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evaporation underground storage tanks for the stockpile, with the help of the American 
engineering firm Fenix and Scisson.18 The state required each of the MOCs to use SFF 
funds (drawn from the public purse) to procure supplies and build storage for additional 
stockpiled reserves, on top of their commercial requirements. Since anti-apartheid boycott 
pressures had not yet reached any great intensity, the initial 1960s-era SFF stockpile was 
acquired freely on the open market. Once news of South Africa’s stockpiling programme 
began to circulate in the global oil trading universe the SFF was inundated with offers of 
large volumes of oil at discounted prices.19 The state did not, at this stage, have to pay high 
premiums – what became known as a ‘pariah penalty’ – for crude, though it soon would. 
 
NATREF, the Oil Shock and Iran  
 
After John Vorster became Prime Minister in 1966 a new strategic emphasis on 
increasing the percentage of the South African oil industry under state control emerged. A 
goal of somewhere in the range of fifty percent ownership was floated by Vorster but both he 
and his cabinet recognised the unavoidably important role of the MOCs. Increased state 
involvement through the likes of SASOL (‘the government’s instrument in the oil domain’) 
had to be balanced with the fact that the country needed to continue to remain attractive to the 
MOCs. ‘We must learn to rise two horses at once’, as Vorster pithily put it.20 This balancing 
act was exemplified by the establishment at the close of the decade of NATREF, a 
conventional crude oil refinery in Sasolburg. That a crude refinery was established in the 
interior highlights how inauspicious conditions were for oil-from-coal expansion at the time. 
Throughout the 1960s into the early 1970s oil was plentiful and (for the time being) cheap 
and oil-from-coal remained on the back-burner, unable to compete economically with 
imported crude. Significantly, NATREF was a joint venture between SASOL (the majority 
owner), the French MOC Total, and the Iranian National Oil Company. The refinery was 
specially built to handle crude from Iran, an increasingly important South African ally fast 
becoming the leading supplier of crude oil to the country, overtaking other Middle Eastern 
sources.21  
In 1973, in response to American support for Israel in the Arab-Israeli War the Arab 
members of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) commenced an oil 
embargo which resulted in an ‘oil shock’, a massive increase in the global price of oil. This 
was quickly followed by the announcement of the extension of the embargo to South Africa, 
Rhodesia and Portugal, in exchange for independent African states supporting the Arabs 
against Israel. The OPEC embargo against South Africa therefore had more to do with 
diplomatic horse-trading than anti-apartheid principle. Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar halted 
oil shipments to South Africa as part of the initial OPEC boycott, but Iran did not, in part 
because of scepticism about the sincerity of such calls for solidarity: Arab states had eagerly 
taken over Iran’s market share during its nationalisation dispute with the British in the early 
1950s. Iran had already become South Africa’s main supplier of crude by the late 1960s, and 
                                                 
18 ‘Petroleum situation and reaction in South Africa’, October 24, 1973. Canonical ID:1973PRETOR03835_b 
Available at: https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1973PRETOR03835_b.html 
 
19 SASOL Archive, SASOL Algemeen, H 4/7/1, S.I. Muller, Min of Econ Affairs to Dr H. Muller, Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, 26 August 1971 
 
20 Sasol Archive, 15/6/1, Petrol Supplies, E. Rousseau to Minister SL Muller, 24 November 1970 
 
21 For more on the general contours of the relationship between Apartheid South Africa and Iran see H.E. 
Chehabi ‘South Africa and Iran in the Apartheid Era’ Journal of Southern African Studies, (42: 4) 687-709 
  
7 
 
the OPEC boycott lead to a dramatic acceleration of this trend to the point that by the end of 
the 1970s Iran provided an estimated ninety per cent of imported crude. The heightened 
global opprobrium which the Soweto uprising of 1976 provoked caused senior South African 
officials to become newly nervous about the extent of this dependence. Minister of Economic 
Affairs Chris Heunis wanted to know how confident South Africa could be that the Shah 
wouldn’t pull the plug on crude supplies. Heunis advised that ‘Iran’s practice had been not to 
mix business and politics’, as its continued supply of crude to South Africa suggested, and 
there could be no better proof than the fact that it had continued to send oil to Israel after the 
Six-Day Arab-Israeli War in 1967, despite Arab nationalist objections.22 Post-revolutionary 
Iran would ultimately adopt the same pecuniary approach when it resumed supplies to 
Apartheid South Africa, despite nominally committing to supporting the anti-Apartheid oil 
boycott.  
Attempting to reassure nervous government officials SASOL cited the ‘direct 
country to country relationship’ with Iran which its managers had nurtured since the mid-
1960s.23 The Shah’s father Reza Shah Pahlavi had been exiled to Johannesburg during 
World War II and in 1970 SASOL had asked Max Kirchhofer, the Swiss architect it had 
commissioned to design Sasolburg, to renovate Reza Shah’s former house and help convert 
it into a museum, with the involvement of the Iranian Embassy.24 SASOL had also 
facilitated the awarding of an Honorary Doctorate by Stellenbosch University to 
Dr. Manouchehr Eghbal, former Iranian Prime Minister, close advisor to the Shah and 
Chairman of the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC).25 The state, via SASOL, had ‘paid 
the club entry fees at the Iranian door’, as one SASOL/SFF manager put it.26 Seemingly 
convinced that the pre-revolution Iranian elite was particularly susceptible to flattery, 
SASOL managers believed NATREF’s frequent invocation in Iranian media suggested the 
project possessed ‘prestige value’ for the Iranians, insulating it from political trouble. 
Nonetheless, Heunis worried that continued Iranian supplies hinged on the Shah remaining 
in power. In reply, SASOL managers presented Iran’s investment in the NATREF refinery 
as an insurance policy against supplies being jeopardised by political change in Tehran. 
This theory would be put to a test at the end of the decade by the Iranian revolution.27   
 
Iranian Revolution, Oil Traders and ‘Pariah Penalties’  
 
Fuel conservation measures introduced by the South African government after the Oil 
Shock and the Arab embargo were neither particularly stringent nor long-lasting. The Arab 
oil embargo did not represent a particularly serious threat to South Africa – many of the 
Arab states quickly turned the taps back on – but the Iranian Revolution most certainly did 
pose a threat, at least initially. On the eve of his coming to power Ayatollah Khomeini had 
                                                 
22 SASOL Archive, 15/14/1, HR Wiggett, Samesprekings in die kantoor van die Minister van Ekonomiese Sake, 
Minister Heunis op 26 November 1976 and SASOL Archive, 15/14/1, J Stegmann to JC Heunis, 1 December 
1976 
 
23 SASOL Archive, 15/14/1, J Stegmann to JC Heunis, 1 December 1976 
 
24 SASOL Archive 9/15/2, National Iranian Oil Company, D. De Villiers to A. Tehrani, 13 February, 1970  
25 SASOL Archive 9/15/1, National Iranian Oil Company, J. Oxley to D. de Villiers, 3 February 1972 
 
26 SASOL Archive 15/6/1 Raffinsbringskapasiteit, H. Wiggett Memorandum, re Samesprekings met Mnr PF 
Theron, Sekretaris van Nywerheidswese, 18 February 1977 
 
27 SASOL Archive, 15/6/1 Raffinsbringskapasiteit, HR Wiggett Memorandum, Samesprekings in die kantoor 
van die Minister van Ekonomiese Sake, Minister Heunis op 26 November 1976.  
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called for the enforcement of an oil boycott against states which had supported the Shah, 
including South Africa. Oil shipments from Iran were disrupted by oil sector strikes in the 
last week of December 1978, shortly ahead of the Ayatollah taking power in February 
1979. Conservation measures were again announced in South Africa and John Vorster 
ordered the printing of petrol coupons in case serious rationing needed to be introduced.28 
With the oil price having increased dramatically yet again, the government instructed 
SASOL to commission a third oil-from-coal plant.  
The possible interruption of crude supplies had been planned for since Sharpeville. 
From the Apartheid state’s perspective the Rhodesian oil boycott, with its mixture of lax 
enforcement and creative and duplicitous circumvention (with SASOL and the MOCs 
playing leading roles) confirmed the suspicion that a successful interruption of oil supplies in 
South Africa’s case would be highly unlikely.29 In response to Tehran’s boycott South Africa 
established an Equalisation Fund funded by fuel levies charged to motorists, which helped 
pay for oil-from-coal expansions at SASOL and generated revenue which the SFF would use 
to pay for crude shipments necessary to make up the massive shortfall caused by the loss of 
Iran supplies.30 This was the first moment when a note of panic entered in, exhibiting as a 
willingness to pay exorbitant amounts of money far above market prices to oil traders who 
promised they could act as intermediaries with oil producers, circumventing obstacles thrown 
up by boycott. The exorbitant mark-up (which could be as high as seventy per cent over and 
above the global oil price) on crude shipments became widely known as a ‘pariah penalty’. 
Dutchman John Deuss, American Marc Rich and Italian Mario Chiavelli were three of the 
main intermediaries who pocketed these ‘pariah premiums’.31 The agreements which 
intermediaries entered into with the Strategic Fuel Fund allowed them to extract extra 
payment on top of the ‘pariah penalty’ in compensation for costs incurred by detours 
necessitated by the need to obscure the source of crude supplies. These were described by a 
senior SFF/SASOL official as ‘costly, yet realistic method under the present 
circumstances.’32 
The Iranian revolution was the moment when the apartheid state signalled its 
willingness to throw a blank cheque at the problem of securing oil supplies. As John 
Malcomess, Progressive Federal Party parliamentarian and energy spokesman observed: 
‘when we lost Iranian supplies, I think [Chris] Heunis lost his head to a certain extent: he was 
prepared to pay any price as long as we got fuel’.33 The SFF was ‘dumped overnight into the 
shady world of international traders’, and ‘international scoundrels and fraudsters descended 
on the country.’34 This was spectacularly demonstrated by the infamous ‘Salem Affair’. A 
boat chartered by an Italian owner bearing the name ‘Salem’ took on board Kuwaiti crude in 
December 1979. Shortly after departure from Kuwait the ship was renamed ‘Lema’ and the 
                                                 
28 ‘Petroleum situation and reaction in South Africa’, October 24, 1973. Canonical ID:1973PRETOR03835_b 
Available at: https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1973PRETOR03835_b.html 
 
29 For Rhodesian oil sanctions see Martin Bailey, Oilgate: The Sanctions Scandal (London: Coronet, 1979); 
Andrew Cohen (2011) Lonrho and Oil Sanctions against Rhodesia in the 1960s, Journal of Southern African 
Studies, 37:4, 715-730 and Luise White Unpopular Sovereignty: Rhodesian Independence and African 
Decolonization. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015) 126-148 
 
30 ‘New Coal-to-Oil Plan; South Africa’ February 3, 1976, Canonical ID:1976JOHANN00126_b Available at: 
https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1976JOHANN00126_b.html 
 
31 For ‘pariah penalty’ see Paul Conlon, ‘South Africa’s Attempts to Reduce Dependence on Imported Oil’, 4. 
32 Embargo, 142  
33 Embargo, 21-22 
34 Embargo, 244; Ellis, External Mission, 143 
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crude cargo sold to Shell Oil for $56 million before being unloaded in Durban where it was 
purchased by SASOL for $43 million. ‘Salem’ was repainted on the ship before it was 
deliberately scuttled off the coast of Senegal and a massive insurance claim lodged by the 
owner of the ship with Lloyd’s for both the ship and the crude which allegedly went down 
with it. It became known as one of the most infamous cases of marine fraud in history, with 
SASOL forced to compensate Shell for the loss of its cargo, at considerable expense to the 
South African taxpayer.35  
 
Anti-Apartheid Forensics, the ANC and Silent Diplomacy 
 
Much of what we know about this murky world of oil boycott circumventions and shady 
dealings is thanks to the laborious research efforts – what I call an ‘anti-apartheid forensics’ – 
of the Amsterdam based anti-apartheid research organisation the Shipping Research Bureau 
or SRB. Brian Lapping had mooted the establishment of a mechanism for monitoring the 
delivery of oil to South Africa in 1964, but it wasn’t until 1978, shortly after the Soweto 
Uprising that an in-depth study into the feasibility of an anti-apartheid oil boycott was 
undertaken by British journalists Martin Bailey and Bernard Rivers, who had recently 
undertaken research on the recent failure of the Rhodesian oil boycott. Their ninety page 
report entitled Oil Sanctions against South Africa was commissioned by the United Nations 
Center Against Apartheid and held out hope that a mandatory UN embargo that would allow 
for the seizure of tankers after a delivery to South Africa or similar sanction but, most 
importantly, advocated monitoring tanker movements using the Lloyd’s shipping database. 
Bailey and Rivers admitted the scheme they outlined could not ensure a complete stoppage of 
deliveries, but they argued ‘it would become extremely difficult - and very expensive – for 
South Africa to obtain transport facilities for importing oil’. As we have seen, increasing the 
financial cost of oil shipments to South Africa was one of the undoubted effects of the work 
undertaken by SRB from its establishment in 1979 until the end of apartheid.  
The SRB was a small private research organisation falling under the Holland 
Committee on Southern Africa and the Working Group Kairos – the two main players in the 
Dutch anti-Apartheid universe. Staffed by no more than two to four members throughout its 
existence, the SRB drew on a global network of ship-spotters and a range of informants 
including sea-fearers, port agents, dockworkers, ‘deep throats’ within shipping companies, 
port shipping registers, newspaper reports, the shipping database of Lloyd’s of London and 
serendipitous bits of information and documentation passed its way.36 One important source 
included the Norwegian missionary based in Durban in the mid-1980s, Per Anders 
Nordengen, who developed contacts with a number of Norwegian sailors and other 
Norwegian-expats with knowledge of the comings and goings of Norwegian oil tankers.37 
The SRB’s researchers worked with a high evidentiary threshold: their publications are 
notably devoid of the sensationalist conjecture which oftentimes characterised anti-apartheid 
pamphlet literature. Researchers carefully weighed, verified and cross-referenced data 
gathered or received from a range of sources. It was necessary to establish the name of 
individual oil tankers calling in South Africa; whether or not individual tankers calling in the 
country in fact off-loaded crude, rather than stopping for other purposes; what the exact 
provenance and estimated volume of off-loaded crude might have been, as well as the 
identity of the persons who owned and/or chartered the tanker in question. The reliability of 
individual pieces of data (and therefore informants or documentation) had to be ascertained. 
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This required cutting through the thicket of increasing degrees of deception and 
misinformation employed in an effort to throw the SRB off the scent: the flying of flags of 
convenience by ship captains; concealing or changing the names painted on the side of ships; 
detours and transhipments and fraudulent discharge certificates. Between its establishment in 
1979 and the end of the boycott in 1993, the SRB identified 865 oil tanker deliveries to South 
Africa. The total capacity of the tankers was 180 million tons. If each tanker delivered a full 
cargo of oil (unlikely, but in terms of economies of scale we can assume larger rather than 
smaller shipments) these tankers alone would have been responsible for eighty-one percent of 
the county’s crude import needs in this period.38  
It was the SRB which first drew the attention of the international media to Deuss’ role 
in 1981. The Iranian revolution had underlined the perils, for the Apartheid state, of not 
diversifying suppliers, and when the attention Deuss attracted in international newspapers 
jeopardised Omani crude sources, it prompted a new bout of anxiety about the risks of over-
reliance on a single trader. SASOL/SFF managers privately claimed that they did their best to 
exercise some degree of control over the financial transactions involved, but admitted that the 
massive volume of oil under Deuss’ control created undoubted opportunities for ‘dishonesty’, 
against which it was, ‘not possible to get full protection.’39 This was fatalistically accepted by 
SASOL/SFF managers and state officials as a necessary evil to be tolerated to secure crude 
supplies.  
Draconian secrecy legislation such as the Petroleum Products Act of 1977 
(subsequently amended in 1979 and 1985) strictly prohibited the disclosure of any 
information shedding light on the production, importation and distribution of oil. This 
fiercely policed veil of secrecy was chiefly employed to inhibit the ability of anti-apartheid 
campaigners to acquire reliable data which might aid boycott efforts and sabotage attempts 
by uMkonto we Sizwe, the armed wing of the ANC, which targeted oil installations, 
including SASOL after the organisation’s turn to armed struggle.40 The MOCs and their 
southern African subsidiaries were adept at hiding behind the secrecy law when it suited 
their interests, as had also been the case in the Rhodesian oil boycott.41  
The SDB established that the majority of crude deliveries facilitated by 
intermediaries like Deuss, Rich and Chiavelli originated from Saudi Arabia, Oman, and the 
United Arab Emirates. These were states which were nominally part of the anti-apartheid 
oil boycott but opportunism reigned. The Iranian revolution and the Ayatollah’s pro-
boycott pronouncements were enthusiastically received in many ANC-aligned leftist 
circles within and without South Africa but not long after the Ayatollah took power Iranian 
crude continued to be delivered to South Africa. According to the SRB between 1979 and 
1987 at least thirty-six Iranian cargoes (more than 9 million tons of oil) arrived in South 
Africa. This was because, as a SASOL manager put it: ‘the eyes are closed in many 
cases’.42 The Iranians, like other nominally Anti-apartheid oil states, had their own reasons 
for continuing to send oil to South Africa. The pecuniary benefits were obvious, especially 
with South Africa willing to pay top-dollar, but other interests-of-state were also important, 
as demonstrated by deals involving the exchange of crude for South African weapons, 
which the Iranians put to use in their ongoing war with Iraq.43  
                                                 
38 Embargo, 89 
39 SASOL Archive, 15/14/1, Stategiese Olievoorrade, Memo, 5 March 1981 
40 On the Petroleum Products Act see Embargo, 73-86 
41 ‘Alleged Diversions to Rhodesia by Mobil Oil South Africa’, October 7, 1976, Canonical 
ID:1976STATE249989_b Available at: https://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1976STATE249989_b.html 
 
 
42 SASOL Archive, 15/14/1, Stategiese Olievoorrade, J Stegmann to JC Heunis, 1 Dec 1976 
43 Embargo, 273. See also Chehabi, ‘South Africa and Iran in the Apartheid Era’, 704. 
  
11 
 
For their part the SRB’s eyes were not closed, but the delicate politics of anti-
apartheid solidarity between the ANC and its allies considerably complicated enforcing the 
boycott. The SRB worked closely with E.S. Reddy, Director of the New York based ANC-
aligned United Nations Centre Against Apartheid and, in particular, with the ANC’s 
boycott specialist in London, Frene Ginwala. The SRB had to tread carefully in relation to 
the ANC line on sanctions. At the outset Ginwala had instructed the Bureau to ‘stress the 
military use of oil’ in its reports on the uses to which oil shipments to South Africa might 
be put.44 Much of the information contained in SRB reports about Apartheid South Africa’s 
oil supplies could, of course, not be published in South Africa itself because of secrecy 
laws. Ironically, the SRB’s relationship to the ANC imposed its own restrictions on what 
the organisation could publish in its annual reports.  
Organisations and activists working on anti-apartheid boycotts were typically 
preoccupied with naming, shaming and terminating the collaboration of Western 
companies and governments with apartheid.45 Given the strength of the anti-apartheid 
movement in Britain and the Netherlands anti-apartheid activists from these countries 
focused their attention on a readily available target and potential source of traction: Shell, 
the Anglo-Dutch oil company. This anti-Western emphasis was true for the SRB too, but 
its research showed that while Western oil companies featured centrally in boycott 
circumventions, South African oil supplies overwhelmingly originated in countries which 
were ANC allies and purported participants in the oil boycott. Ginwala admitted ‘at least 
some elements in the governments of those countries must have been fully aware of what 
was going on.’46 The ANC preferred a ‘silent diplomacy’ approach to the SRBs instinct to 
publicise its findings in order to name and shame non-compliant, hypocritical allies. In a 
meeting ahead of the publication of the SRB’s second report on shipments to South Africa 
Alfred Nzo ‘fumed that we had brought some of the ANC’s allies into discredit by having 
published their names in the first report.’47 An agreement was reached between the SRB’s 
parent organisations, the Kairos Group and the Holland Committee on Southern Africa and 
the ANC that in future SRB research publications should ‘avoid the impression’ of blaming 
the oil-producing countries’ and should instead stress the complicity of Western 
companies.48  
This was the origin of report language generically identifying the source of crude as 
the ‘Arabian Gulf’ instead of signalling out individual countries. Interviewed by the SRB at 
the end of apartheid, Ginwala explained that they had been cautious ‘because we felt the 
focus shouldn’t shift from where it really belonged.’ The idea had been that the SRB 
should not reveal the names of anti-apartheid allies in violation of the boycott in order to 
give the ANC time to ‘try and put pressure on them.’ Ginwala described the ANC’s 
position as a delicate balancing act: 
 
One should take the political dilemmas which faced us at the time into account. Many 
countries were engaged in breaking all the sanctions, including those on oil. The main 
collaborators with the apartheid regime were Britain, the US, France and Germany. The 
ANC could not afford to view the oil embargo as an isolated issue. If we focussed on one 
group of countries, then the others would use that group as a scapegoat in order to 
absolve themselves. The Arab countries were part of the Third World and members of 
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the Non-Aligned Movement, and we regarded them as our allies. In our dealings with 
them we could not exclusively deal with oil matters but had to include the broad political 
context. We had to ensure we didn’t disrupt our relations with those who supported us, 
and this affected the embargo.49 
 
In time the ANC’s injunction against the SRB explicitly naming specific Arab countries in 
its reports would ease somewhat, but the ANC’s attempts at bringing moral suasion to bare 
upon allies in breach of the oil boycott were neither successful nor particularly dogged. 
Ginwala admitted:  
 
If somebody, supposedly your friend, looks you straight in the eyes and tells you that 
these allegations are just not true, what more can one do? They always promised to 
investigate it; by then two years had elapsed and other items were high on the agenda. It 
was a balancing act; the political context restricted what we were able to do. The talks 
would always be very pleasant, but I do not know of any cases where we got the results 
we had hoped for.50  
 
Since the Netherlands was essentially pro-Israel in its foreign policy at this time, the Arab 
governments accused the Amsterdam-based SRB of engaging in Anti-Arab, Pro-Israel 
propaganda. It didn’t help the SRB that in 1984 staunchly pro-Israel US-based lobby 
group, the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), employing the SRB’s own 
research methodology put two and two together, cross-checking data in the first and third 
SRB reports with data contained in the Lloyd’s shipping database and concluded that ‘Arab 
countries evading the embargo have increased their share of the South African market in 
two years to an ‘abnormally large share.’ The AIPAC told the Associated Press that ‘the 
Arab posture at the U.N., where they pose as great friends of black Africa and spread gross 
exaggerations and distortions about Israel’s relations with South Africa, is a sham.’51 
Accusing the SRB of concealing details about the specific country of origin of Middle 
Eastern crude, the war of words soon became a game of tit-for-tat at the United Nations. 
The net result was that this increased pressure on the SRB to begin naming individual 
Middle Eastern suppliers. The SRB had begun to worry that treating Middle Eastern 
suppliers with kid-gloves damaged its credibility in ‘Western political circles.’52 
Jaap Woldendorp, SRB director over the course of the second half of the 1980s 
would later characterise this self-censorship as ‘a serious blot on our otherwise 
unblemished record’; it was abundantly clear, he admitted, that the oil-producing countries 
were ‘not merely innocent victims of Western companies’, as the ANC’s narrative 
implied.53 The pattern repeated itself in cases where socialist countries, including staunch 
ANC and South African Communist Party ally, the Soviet Union, was the source of oil. 
The ANC might raise the violation which would then be met with emphatic denial despite 
evidence to the contrary which was in the SRB’s possession.54 Ginwala observed: ‘in the 
late 1970s, early 1980s the problem with the oil embargo wasn’t to get support for it in 
principle. You could get resolutions easily. Enforcement was the problem.’55 Ginwala 
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admitted that the boycott effort had been undermined by a lack of serious political will at 
the highest levels of the ANC:  
 
Unfortunately – I want to be honest about this – the ANC didn’t do its work. We could 
have done much more. Partly, we were too busy and partly, a lot of people didn’t 
appreciate the significance of the embargo. We could have applied much more pressure 
which for various reasons we didn’t.56  
 
Conclusion 
  
We cannot know with any certainty whether serious moral suasion would have succeeded 
in convincing the ANC’s boycott-violating allies to stem the flow of crude to South Africa. 
The SRB hoped the ANC would lean more heavily on allies not respecting the boycott 
because it certainly believed this would make a difference. In an attempt to persuade the 
ANC to take these violations more seriously, the SRB pointed to cases of other oil 
producing countries like Kuwait, Libya and Algeria, which had acted successfully to 
prevent their oil from flowing to South Africa.57 The ANC’s dependence on financial and 
other solidarities placed it in a difficult position vis-à-vis allies who were in violation of the 
boycott, constraining its ability to act. Even if the ANC had succeeded in persuading the 
major oil producing Middle Eastern countries and nominal allies to behave – or, indeed, if 
the Western powers had relented in their opposition to a United Nations backed mandatory 
boycott – it is likely rogue oil producers and middle-men like Chiavelli, Rich and Deuss 
would have conspired to ensure the continued delivery of oil supplies to South Africa. As 
Brewster Kingman Jnr, Brian Lapping and Etienne Rousseau each anticipated for their own 
reasons, boycotts, by their nature, create lucrative opportunities for their violation. Cold 
War realpolitik and the pecuniary interests of MOCs, Middle Eastern oil producing states 
and oil traders were all important reasons why the boycott did not go beyond escalating the 
financial costs of Apartheid. This article has highlighted an aspect which has hitherto 
escaped the attention of scholars of the boycott effort: the ANC’s reluctance to single out 
Middle Eastern allies who supplied Apartheid South Africa with oil, and the SRB’s 
willingness, tortured though it was, to obscure the primary sources of oil shipments to the 
country.  
 
*** 
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